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Abstract—This paper discusses the findings of a series of four
focus group sessions carried out on a variant of the original
Preˆt a` Voter prototype implementation [2]. The aim of these
sessions was to investigate users’ ability to use the system,
to discover any inadequacies of the system, and to gauge the
participants’ understanding of its security mechanisms. The
groups also discussed general issues around security in election
systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper reports on a series of four focus group sessions
carried out on a variant of the original Preˆt a` Voter prototype
implementation [2]. The aim of carrying out these focus
groups was to gain an understanding of the various issues
that voters might have with an implementation of Preˆt a`
Voter, including, but not limited to, their ability to use
the system correctly; their understanding of the system, in
particular its security features; their trust in the system; and
their attitudes to the system. We were particularly interested
in identifying issues at an early stage that will require
addressing in the next implementation of Preˆt a` Voter. These
issues might range from straightforward usability issues
which are easy to address, through the identification of
security mechanisms that users are unwilling or unable to
use in practice.
The version of Preˆt a` Voter used for these focus groups
was based on the existing prototype previously developed
at the University of Surrey [2], based on the design in [4].
The Single Transferable Vote election method used in the
original implementation was replaced for the focus groups
by the First Past The Post method. The ballot form contained
only one race, with nine (fictitious) candidates, rather than
several races as had been used previously. This simplified
the casting of a vote to the marking of a single ‘X’ against
the selected candidate on the ballot form, as occurs in UK
general elections, providing a voting experience as familiar
as possible to the participants.
II. BACKGROUND: PREˆT A` VOTER
Preˆt a` Voter [7] is proposed as an end-to-end verifiable
voting system. It is designed to enable an audit trail from the
voters casting their votes through to the final tally. It achieves
this in several stages: the voters are able to verify that their
vote has been included in the processing of the votes; the
processing of the votes (which involves anonymising and
decrypting the votes) can be verified by independent auditors
who are able to confirm that the votes output correspond
to the votes input; and the tallying of the decrypted votes,
which can be verified independently, since the decrypted
votes are public. There are several variations on the technical
details of how this is done, as discussed in [7]. The version
used in the focus groups was based on the decryption mixnet
scheme of [4] whose implementation is described in [2].
However, the voter experience is similar across the various
designs, so the findings from the focus groups, which are
concerned with the voter experience, understanding, and
responses, are applicable across the Preˆt a` Voter family.
To provide the intended security, Preˆt a` Voter requires
voters to follow particular procedures: to cast their vote, to
participate in ballot audits, and to check later that their vote
has been included. Ballot forms each contain a list of candi-
dates in a randomised order, and a voter is asked to mark a
box against their preferred candidate (see Appendix A). The
form is then divided down the middle, to separate the list of
candidate list from the marked box, and the list of candidates
is destroyed. The remaining half contains the marked box
consisting of the vote, and also the order of candidates in
an encrypted form as a barcode (for the system to later
reconstruct the vote), as in the following example:
The marked box could have been against any candidate,
so this half does not give away who the vote was cast for,
thus providing vote secrecy. It is scanned for submission
to the system for processing, and the voter retains a record
of what has been scanned, for later checking that it was
included. The barcode is not decrypted at this stage.
In Preˆt a` Voter, voters are also offered the opportunity to
audit ballot forms. The integrity of the election relies on the
integrity of the ballot forms: that the encrypted candidate
order used to reconstruct the vote matches the order printed
on the ballot form. One of the proposed ways of ensuring
the integrity of the ballot forms is to ask voters to carry
out checks and in some cases ask for an audit of a ballot
form they have been given. Audit of a ballot form involves
decrypting the encrypted candidate order and checking that
the result matches the printed list. Not all voters are required
to do this, but we assume that sufficiently many will choose
to audit, to provide the random sampling necessary to detect
any attack on integrity with sufficiently high probability.
Thus there are three processes involving the voter in Preˆt
a` Voter:
• Voting: the primary purpose;
• Ballot auditing: to ensure integrity of the ballot forms;
• Checking inclusion of the vote: to ensure their vote will
be counted as cast.
There are other checks and security measures involved in
the stages of processing the votes, but these do not involve
the voter and so we are not concerned with them in this
paper.
III. FOCUS GROUP SETUP
Four focus group sessions were run in total: two in
Crawley, Sussex, UK (24 February 2010), and two in Birm-
ingham, UK (1 March 2010). In each location the groups
were separated by age, using the age ranges ‘over 35’ and
‘18–35’, referred to in this document as Group 1 and Group
2 respectively. There were approximately eight participants
in each group, and they were screened to have voted ‘in a
recent election’ when invited to participate.
Focus groups have previously been successful in eliciting
voter attitudes [9]. They provide a good way of identifying
a range of reactions and viewpoints at an early stage of
development, while high level design decisions are still
under discussion. The intention in our case was to use an
initial prototype to obtain reactions, concerns and aspects of
voter understanding, which would inform our development
of the next version of Preˆt a` Voter.
The discussions were held at custom viewing facilities,
and in each case were chaired by a professional facilitator:
one for Crawley and one for Birmingham. Although the
facilitators were different in the two locations, they both used
the same discussion guide, which had been prepared before
any of the discussions took place. The research team did not
come into direct contact with any of the participants, but
were able to watch the discussions from behind a one-way
mirror. The participants were made aware that the research
was being conducted by Surrey University, and that some of
research team were behind the mirror. The discussions were
recorded by video and later transcribed.
Each session lasted around 90 minutes. The sessions
began with a general discussion about voting and brought
in security issues. The Preˆt a` Voter prototype system was
explained and discussed, and then the participants were
asked to carry out several tasks on the system: voting,
auditing, and checking their vote. They discussed their
experience, and their understanding of the various aspects of
the system design was explored. The full discussion guide
used for the sessions is reproduced in Appendix B.
The transcripts of the focus group discussions were anal-
ysed by the facilitators, who each extracted the key points
from the discussions and provided a written report on the
sessions. The research team took notes of significant points
during the sessions, and also reviewed the transcripts to
identify issues.
IV. FINDINGS FOR PREˆT A` VOTER
Once the system had been introduced, participants were
asked to carry out various tasks using the system. Our
interest lay in observing how easily they could carry out
the voting task, how well they understood the security
mechanisms underneath the processes, and their attitudes to
the various elements of Preˆt a` Voter.
A. Casting a vote
The first task they were asked to carry out was to cast a
vote. Participants were provided with the instruction sheet
‘Voting with the Preˆt a` Voter voting system’ (reproduced in
Appendix C) and asked to perform the following tasks: select
a candidate, mark an ‘X’ by their chosen name, separate the
list of names on the left-hand side from the marked right-
hand side, feed the left-hand side through the shredder, and
then have their ballot form scanned and receive the receipt.
When participants had completed these tasks, they were then
asked to check that the printed receipt matched what had
been scanned, and to retain it.
In general, most participants were able to cast votes to
their satisfaction, and to check that the receipt matched
the vote that had been cast in terms of the position of
the ‘X’. However, upon review of the voting process and
participant comments several minor and major deviations
from the instructions were identified that indicate either an
improper design or a lack of participant understanding.
Two design issues brought up during the voting process
related to how the ballot sheet was formed and read. One
point of slight confusion encountered by one of the Crawley
groups was which way the ballot should be inserted into
the machine. Another participant asked how the scanning
and audit technology would operate in the event of over- or
under-voting.
A more significant issue was that, in one of the groups, the
voters forgot to shred the list of names, and simply formed a
queue at the scanner. Hence even with a facilitator who had
a reasonable understanding of the system, and a discussion
with the group about how the destruction of the left-hand
side ensured secrecy of the vote, the group collectively forgot
to shred their left-hand sides as required by step 3 of the
instruction sheet. When asked about their failure to shred
the left hand half they said it did not matter to them.
Facilitator: None of you have taken off your
list of names and shredded it, why
is that?
Respondent: Actually I’ve got to be honest we
all think, we all did just follow the
person in front of us, so who’s to
blame?
Facilitator: Does it matter, do you wish you
had?
Respondent: No, not really, I suppose you get
another bit of paper in your hand
but other than that...
Birmingham Group 2
The participants appeared to understand the reason for the
random order of names when it was explained to them, and
could see that this ensured that the marked vote (and the
receipt) did not indicate the selected candidate, but only a
position on a random list. They did not express any particular
usability concern about the names appearing in a random
order.
However, later comments on the receipt showed this
understanding to be superficial in some cases. Some partic-
ipants expressed an expectation that the receipt should say
who the vote was for (perhaps this expectation was raised
by the word ‘receipt’).
I think that actually seeing a name is the thing
that puts your mind at ease, rather than matching
up your cross there.
Crawley Group 2
I do think if you could, say you do want to just
go home and confirm it’s more reassuring when
you know that you have actually put the cross in
the right place. Because you could have voted for
Bill and not Ben by accident. It is just confirming.
Crawley Group 2
This indicates that they had not fully understood the purpose
of randomising the list of names, which is precisely to ensure
that the evidence provided does not indicate who the vote
was for.
There was some discomfort that the vote casting process
does not provide direct feedback of who the vote is for. In
the casting of the vote, participants would like to see the
name of the candidate they have voted for on a small screen
to confirm that their vote has been entered.
Yes, I’d agree that if it came up with a name
just on a small screen and so you know you fed
your vote in and it came up with a name, you
could walk away confident that it has read that
bit of encryption and it has come up with that
name and so you can walk away happily. Then if
you wanted to dispute it at a later stage, if you
want to dispute the system then each individual
is responsible for not only casting their vote, but
reading the name on the screen.
Crawley Group 2
They had no concerns regarding possible secrecy issues
in this respect. They indicated that they would rather risk
someone else seeing their vote than any uncertainty that their
correct vote has been registered.
I would rather the chance that somebody might
look over my shoulder and glance at who I voted
for, and know that my vote has gone to the correct
person, than perhaps have doubts in this system,
having not been told by e-mail or on a little
screen that my vote for Daniel has actually gone
through.
Crawley Group 2
B. Auditing a ballot form
Participants were able to carry out the instructions from
the instruction sheet ‘Checking ballot forms in the Preˆt a`
Voter voting system’, and the actual process of auditing was
quite straightforward for participants.
However, there was less understanding of the purpose of
auditing ballot forms, or at least offering that possibility to
the voters themselves. One group (Birmingham Group 1)
were not interested in auditing ballot forms and had to be
cajoled into it, and of that group one participant doing an
audit did not compare the lists of names.
Some considered that an audit would not provide certainty
because it did not relate to their actual ballot paper, and that
there might still be room for error with other papers.
Some participants who had concerns felt that these would
not be allayed by checking the occasional ballot paper.
If it’s just like a percentage, then I guess it’s how
much is it going to be audited really.
Crawley Group 2
You can’t tell that just checking the odd one here
and there.
Crawley Group 2
Furthermore, there was a feeling that if a ballot paper did
not audit then trust would be gone for ever.
Even if you’d voted like that for fifteen years and
you’d got it right and you check it and it gets it
wrong just once you’d think for the last fifteen
years everything’s gone wrong.
Birmingham Group 2
It would be an instant loss of faith and I think a
lot of people would lose it if something came up
wrong.
Birmingham Group 1
Hence there is an understanding that audits have the potential
to expose problems with the system.
However, this understanding did not translate into a desire
to carry out audits. Participants were not in the mindset
of wanting to check that the system was indeed behaving
correctly. In some cases they felt uncomfortable even with
the discussion that the system might not be trustworthy.
I think obviously England would be shocked if
there was some conspiracy in the voting system
because we kind of demand and agree in ourselves
that it is trustworthy, so you know I’m not sure. Is
this telling us that there is something not right?
Is it a corrupt system?
Birmingham Group 1
In some cases they felt it was inappropriate to be asked to
check a system they could be asked to vote with.
Facilitator: But you’re saying that if the sys-
tem were proven to be inaccurate
then the whole system would fail,
but you don’t want proof that it is
accurate?
Respondent: We trust.
Respondent: We trust.
Respondent: You have got to trust.
Respondent: You’ve got trust in the current
system haven’t you.
Birmingham Group 1
Some expressed an expectation that the system should be
validated and approved fit for purpose prior to their involve-
ment with it.
If there are any doubts about the process, the
system, then people wouldn’t go. A lot of people
wouldn’t go, if they had those doubts, they
wouldn’t bother. So the certainty has to be before
the system is started up.
Crawley Group 1
C. Checking inclusion of the vote
Participants were able to carry out the instructions from
the instruction sheet ‘Checking your vote has been included
in the count in the Preˆt a` Voter voting system’, and the
actual process of checking the receipt on the website was
quite straightforward for participants.
Some wanted to see how they had voted. For some
participants, confirming simply that their encrypted vote
on the bulletin board corresponded to their receipt did not
provide a sufficient guarantee for them. They wanted to see
who they had voted for, and complained that:
You can’t tell, or be reassured that your vote has
been registered for who you voted for.
Birmingham Group 2
For most participants, having a receipt did not appear to add
anything in terms of their trust in the system. They noted
that they do not have a receipt with the current system used
in the UK, and have no need for one.
You don’t have one now, why do you need another
one?
Crawley Group 1
What is the advantage, the bonus of doing that?
Why would you want to go and do that, because
you know you’ve voted and I’ve got a receipt?
I mean why would I want to go and do that
process?
Birmingham Group 1
However, some recognised that the receipt gave more con-
firmation than is available with the current system.
To be honest it’s more confirmation than what
we get now because at the minute we just have
somebody sitting there that says thanks, I will
count that later but we don’t even, they might just
think oh forget it and just screw it up and chucks
them in the bin.
Birmingham Group 2
The majority of participants said they would not bother to
check their receipt, but were happy that others were doing
it.
I can’t see me going back home to check it.
Birmingham Group 1
You’d have the small minority that would want to
check but most people would walk out and as far
as they’ve walked out, they’ve voted, it’s finished
with until they hear the result and then they just
get on with it.
Birmingham Group 1
I think if you were happy to use this system, I
don’t think I would personally require a receipt,
so you could maybe have it as an option if
somebody wanted a receipt
Crawley Group 1
This was also seen in the context of auditing:
It might not be something that we would bother
for ourselves but it’s got to be in place hasn’t it,
it’s still got to be in place.
Birmingham Group 1
Others could not see the point of checking the receipt online.
I know what I voted for and that’s it and it’s
electronic then it’s gone.
Birmingham Group 1
Well that receipt clearly shows where I put my
‘X’ in, so why would I need to check it online?
Birmingham Group 2
V. MORE GENERAL FINDINGS
Some more general attitudes and views also emerged
during the course of the focus groups.
A. Time and Convenience
Firstly, it is clear that time and convenience is important.
There were concerns that the voting process takes longer
and that there are more steps.
The thing is now you go in, you take your card
and you get a ticket, you go to the booth, you
cross it and you walk out again.. This you’ve got
to tear it, shred it, go over to the thing, get a
receipt, it’s more time. If it’s a computer screen
you walk in, bang, bang, bang, it just seems a lot
of waste of paper and very time-consuming.
Birmingham Group 1
You just expect to just go in, vote and then come
out.
Birmingham Group 2
One voter (Crawley Group 1) had a vote that was not
correctly read by the system first time. He did not wish to try
again despite being offered the opportunity. It appeared that
he felt he had done as much as he was prepared to do, and
did not want to engage when it did not succeed first time.
The desire for speed and convenience was also evident in
the suggestions for other ways of voting, either through a
touchscreen, or remotely:
So why are they bothering with the paper? Why
are they not just giving you a screen where you
just push a button and walk away?
Birmingham Group 1
But if you could do it on the internet then you
wouldn’t have to leave the pub would you.
Birmingham Group 2
Anybody got an iPhone, I want to vote, it would
be great.
Birmingham Group 2
Text messages, things like that.
Crawley Group 1
Even through the telly you can, can’t you?
Crawley Group 1
I’d rather be able to sit at home and do it online,
surely it must be easier for them to count all the
votes and things like that.
Birmingham Group 2
However, there was a recognition that such approaches might
be less secure.
Oh voting, I’m always a bit dodgy with voting
online because anybody can get in. You’ve only
got to accidentally leave a password lying round
or someone can have a lucky guess, so I wouldn’t
really go online and do it.
Birmingham Group 2
B. Vote privacy
The majority of the participants said they personally
were not concerned with others knowing how they voted,
though there was a general recognition that vote secrecy was
important and that other voters might want to keep their vote
secret.
However, some also seemed to accept without concern
that ‘they’ might know how you voted, and almost saw how
they voted in the same way as other ‘consumer information’
that might be retained about them:
Tesco know, Tesco’s know what you shop for, it’s
the same and pet insurance and stuff like that, so
they can sift out anything can’t they
Birmingham Group 1
Yes of course it can [learn how you have voted
and retain that for future reference] because if
you go to Amazon, if you are buying books it
knows whether you like history, horror you know,
it’s nothing for it to pick up on what you are
going to vote in the future as such.
Birmingham Group 1
C. Trust in computer systems
Attitudes to trust in computer systems generally will
naturally be a factor in voters’ trust in an electronic voting
system. There was a perception that some trust needed to be
invested in the system, and that explanations of its security
need to be available.
You’re putting a lot of trust into this encryption
code that it’s actually voting for the right
candidate.
Crawley Group 2
I’m not certain. I’m not. I’d have to be convinced
that it was a secure system, as I see it. I know
what you’re saying about the post on one hand,
that my figures, do you know what I mean? I’d
like to know what the controls are on it.
Crawley Group 1
There was also a general awareness of the kind of things
that can go wrong with computer systems, accidentally or
maliciously, and some well known failures in the UK were
mentioned.
If it’s a computer, it might be more liable to be
tampered with
Crawley Group 1
What if there a server failure or something like
that; it just loses all the votes. It’s not like the
tickets get mixed up and you can do a recount of
that box. Once it’s clicked and it’s gone, do you
really know that it’s voted.
Crawley Group 1
I think with all this data going missing, in the
NHS, people’s records, personal records and
things like that, all this so called ‘secure’ data,
you know these people have no doubt gone to the
best people to do the job and yet it’s still going
missing. So I think the concern is that this could
happen again you know.
Crawley Group 1
VI. SUMMARY OF ISSUES RAISED
The purpose of the focus groups was to elicit issues to be
considered in the development of the next prototype of Preˆt a`
Voter for use in wider ranging user trials. Some suggestions
can be incorporated, but others (e.g. receipts showing how
you voted) are not appropriate owing to the very nature of
the system. Some of the issues raised will require further
research.
A. Considerations for enhancing Preˆt a` Voter
In functional terms, participants were generally able to
cast votes with Preˆt a` Voter without difficulty, and to follow
the instructions for auditing and for checking their receipt.
However, their understanding of some of the security
aspects was not so strong. This can have an impact on
security, since it may affect whether voters carry out the
procedures which are necessary to provide the security
assurances, such as shredding the left-hand side, auditing
ballots, and checking receipts.
These observations concur with those reported on trials
with Scantegrity II [3, 8], and with a range of prototype vote
verification systems [5, Chapter 6]. In those cases voters
were on the whole able to cast a vote without significant
additional difficulty, but their behaviour or their responses
to questionnaires indicated a weaker understanding of or
interest in the security mechanisms. For example, it was
observed in the Scantegrity Mock Takoma Park voting trial
[8] that
”Some Mock1 voters were enthusiastic about the
security features of Scantegrity, but most seemed
not to care much about security, focusing primarily
on the physical process of receiving a ballot,
marking the ballot, and scanning the ballot.”
Given voters’ primary focus on casting their vote, with the
security mechanisms secondary in some cases, we should
perhaps consider other ways of carrying out the security
procedures. Further, in view of the participants’ emphasis
on time and convenience, the design of the system should
aim to minimise the expectations on the voter who wishes
simply to cast their vote with the least possible overhead
in processes or need to understand. In any case, the key
point is that the system must not be able to tell reliably
which voters are carrying out the security checks, so that
the security-conscious voters are a random sample unknown
to the system.
Strong procedures will need to be in place to ensure that
the left-hand side of the ballot is indeed destroyed when a
vote is cast. Our experience suggests that it is not enough
to rely on officials or poll workers to remind voters and to
enforce this, and not enough to rely on voters who also may
not understand the reasoning, or who may not themselves
have privacy concerns.
With regards to audits and to checking receipts, it may
be appropriate to involve some authority in either or both of
these tasks, either to augment voters’ participation or else
to take it over. This approach was taken to auditing ballots
in the use of Scantegrity II in the Takoma Park municipal
election [3], where an official carried out audits of ballot
forms throughout election day; checking receipts was left to
the voters.
Participants’ desire for a speedy process also highlights
that it is important that the scanning of votes and printing
of receipts must be fast and reliable, and that the hard-
ware in the next prototype should be as fast as reasonably
practicable. The danger if queues could form is that voters
may decide not to wait, or that poll workers are put under
pressure, or that voters are themselves put under pressure
if there is a problem with their vote that requires some
corrective action which holds up the queue.
B. Privacy vs convenience
The Preˆt a` Voter system is designed to provide the highest
levels of vote privacy: that a voter cannot be linked directly
to their vote. It provides privacy both from other people
(in that the receipt does not indicate the vote), and from
the components of the election system itself, by distributing
trust.
However, additional elements can be added to Preˆt a` Voter
which make voting easier or more convenient, or increase
voters’ confidence in the system, but with some compromise
of privacy. For example, the use of touchscreens, or remote
voting, can be considered.
In considering possible additions to Preˆt a` Voter it is
important to understand the tradeoff of privacy against
convenience. There were a variety of views expressed on
their importance for participants, which give rise to questions
concerning the extent to which privacy can be weakened. For
example
• Can a voting device be permitted to know (transiently)
your vote?
• Equipment is intended to ensure certain properties (e.g.
that it is not retaining information about your vote).
What safeguards and assurances are acceptable?
Participants were aware that some approaches gave weaker
guarantees, for example that internet voting was more vul-
nerable, but did not seem uncomfortable with that.
Expectations on a new system
Thus introducing a new technology might raise new
expectations derived from experiences that appear similar,
such as use of Electronic Point of Sale systems. The un-
derstanding of ‘receipts’ is one example: receipts seemed
to introduce an expectation of what should be on them.
However, this may be due to the terminology used; the word
‘receipt’ may have connotations that some other name (e.g.
‘confirmation slip’) does not.
One area for further research would be to elicit the
expectations on voting systems; and if the current system
changes in particular ways, to identify how the expectations
change. A related research question would be the extent to
which expectations depend on the terminology used.
VII. VOTERS’ UNDERSTANDING OF PREˆT A` VOTER
SECURITY
Participants’ understanding of the various security mecha-
nisms of Preˆt a` Voter were varied, and it was difficult to elicit
in the focus group setting how strong their understanding
was. More systematic experiments with Preˆt a` Voter would
be required to gain a better understanding of how well users
can understand the elements of Preˆt a` Voter, and this would
be an aspect worth exploring in greater depth, to inform the
best way of presenting and running Preˆt a` Voter in the field.
A related question is the extent to which voters need to
understand the security mechanisms in order to participate in
voting. It seems likely that an understanding of the reason,
e.g. for checking the receipt, is more likely to encourage
voters to follow the processes, and conversely a lack of
understanding will lead to these processes being ignored.
It may be appropriate to revise or replace processes whose
motivation is not so well understood.
A. Terminology
Analogy and metaphor are strong tools for explanation,
but the examples must be carefully chosen to be properly
effective. We need to take care that we relate the voting pro-
cess to something voters already know. However, accurate
analogies familiar to voters are not so easy to find. Adida [1]
discusses why assurance in voting systems is not analagous
to assurance in banking systems, or in flight control software,
but it is difficult to find common examples of systems that
are similar. One example is ‘gift receipts’, which give the
idea of a receipt with only partial information (the price is
omitted).
We also find that the use of particular words raises
expectations and associations for the participants. We saw
this with reference to ‘receipt’ and to the ‘audit’ process.
The word ‘receipt’ has connotations of evidence of a
transaction, and some participants thus expected the receipt
to indicate who they had voted for. Being more explicit about
what the receipt contains, perhaps calling it a ‘vote inclusion
record’, might help in managing voters’ expectations.
The word ‘audit’ may have negative connotations, since
it is concerned with evaluation and checking of systems or
processes, and we saw some discomfort around the idea that
the systems might not be trustworthy. A more positive word
such as ‘verification’ or ‘confirmation’ may be a more user-
friendly name for what the Preˆt a` Voter literature has termed
‘ballot audit’.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The focus groups have provided some initial information
into the ability of voters to use the Preˆt a` Voter system, and
their understanding of it. It has also raised more general
issues that we will also need to take into consideration in
our design of the next version of Preˆt a` Voter.
Broadly speaking, we have seen that voters are able to
cast a vote and to carry out the tasks of auditing a ballot and
checking their receipt. However, they can make mistakes that
have security implications, as we saw one entire group forget
to shred the left-hand half of their ballot, compromising
privacy.
Their understanding of the various security mechanisms,
and the levels of assurance that the system provides, was
more varied. It seems that it will not be possible to rely
on voters’ understanding of the system as motivation for
carrying out ballot audit and receipt checking, and so our
approach to these aspects of the system should be revisited.
The groups provided only a snapshot of public attitudes to
voting, but it raises some intriguing questions and will also
inform our approach to public presentation and explanation
of the system. Time and convenience are very important to
voters, in some cases more than the privacy of their vote.
The view was expressed by some participants that they want
to trust their voting system, and expect it to be validated in
advance — they did not fully grasp the idea of auditing
ballots during the election.
Trust in computer systems generally is also an issue. Al-
though participants were often generally trusting of technol-
ogy, they were also aware of high profile failures and some
had questions about the security. This particular issue is in
fact expressly addressed by Preˆt a` Voter, which is designed
specifically to avoid the need to trust the computer system:
one of the design principles is ‘software independence’ [6]:
that the information generated by the system can be checked
independently. However, presenting this argument in an
accessible way remains a challenge.
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APPENDIX
A. Ballot form
The ballot form is printed on an A4 piece of paper with
a perforation down the middle. Different forms provide the
left-hand list of names in different orders, and the encrypted
information regarding the order of the names is contained
in the 2D bar code on the right hand side.
B. Focus group discussion guide
The focus groups in Crawley and in Birmingham all used
the following discussion guide, developed in advance of the
first focus group.
Introduction
• Introduce self — independent professional market
researcher from SSMR (based at University of Sur-
rey)
• Explain purpose of group — to help develop a
possible computer-based voting system
• Introduce recording — reassure re confidentiality
— reporting only in general terms (but will have
agreed to DVD recording)
• Explain presence of University of Surrey personnel
(in next room)
Personal introductions
• First name, occupation, when last voted (if can
remember)
Background on voting (Aim for overall view, not too much
detail on any point)
• What do you think about the current voting system
in the UK (the actual process, not issues of repre-
sentation etc.)?
• Do you have any concerns about the way we vote?
• What about voting in other countries?
• PROMPT as necessary if not mentioned:
– Secrecy of ballot (Does this matter to you? Do
you feel voting in the UK is secret?)
– Coercion
– Votes not being counted correctly
– Votes not being included (e.g. Iran)
– Votes not being registered (e.g. hanging
chads)
– Vote stuffing (e.g. Afghanistan)
– People casting wrong vote/spoiling ballot by
mistake (e.g. Scotland)
Introduce new system by explanation plus provision of
information sheet for reference
• Note:
– Random order of questions
– Encrypted information in righthand block
shows which answers are to which questions
– Serial number identifies voter
– Tear paper in half
– Feed half into system
– Take this half away with them (other half shred-
ded)
– Receipt is printed out
Tasks
• EXPLAIN TASKS (make sure each is clearly under-
stood)
1) Vote for a particular candidate (allow respon-
dents to compare ballot papers)
2) Check a receipt (visually)
3) Audit a ballot form i.e. feed a blank receipt into
the machine, audit will reconstruct lefthand
side so can check (can’t then use for voting)
4) Check the vote on the bulletin board (via web-
site on another laptop — type in serial number
from receipt, will then show physical position
of markers, confirms vote has gone into the
system)
• All carry out one task, then ask for their reactions
to that task — run through tasks one at a time
(OBSERVE any difficulties)
1) How easy did you find it to cast your vote?
Would anything have made it any easier? Do
you like voting on paper and feeding it in?
Why/why not? Or would you prefer a fully
electronic interface?
2) Would you prefer to have the original as a
receipt or one printed out to check? Or both?
Does this matter to you?
3) How easy was it to audit a ballot paper? Would
anything have made it any easier?
4) Does using the bulletin board make sense?
Do you know what you are looking for? Do
you think you would actually do this? Does this
increase trust in the system?
Overall:
• Do you feel that using this system would make you
feel reassured that your vote has been included? Is
this important to you?
• How do you feel this system compares with the
current paper ballot:
– ease of use?
– trust in the system?
– security?
• What would help you to trust this system more?
(e.g. endorsement by media — which?)
Understanding
• Do you understand each of the following:
– Why the names are in a different order on
different forms?
– Why the names are in random order?
– Why the ballot paper is split in half?
– The reason for auditing a ballot paper?
– What it would mean if a ballot paper didn’t
audit?
– What it would mean if the receipt came out
wrong?
Finally:
Going back to some of the things you said about
voting at the beginning (PROMPT AS REQUIRED), to
what extent do you think this system addresses your
concerns?
Check with client whether any further issues; feed in as
required
Is there anything else you’d like to say about the
system?
Thanks and Close
C. Information sheets
Three information sheets were provided to the focus group
participants during the sessions, as follows:
• Voting with the Preˆt a` Voter voting system
• Checking ballot forms in the Preˆt a` Voter voting system
• Checking your vote has been included in the count in
the Preˆt a` Voter voting system
These are reproduced below:
Voting with the Preˆt a` Voter voting system
1) Mark an ‘X’ against your preferred can-
didate
2) Fold and tear the ballot form in half along
the perforation
3) Shred the left-hand half
4) Scan the right-hand half
5) Check the receipt matches the right-
hand half
6) Retain the receipt for later checking
[The order of candidates is different on differ-
ent ballot forms, so the receipt does not give
away how you voted]
Checking ballot forms in the Preˆt a` Voter
voting system
1) Do not mark the ballot form
2) Tell the officials you want to check your
ballot form
3) Tear the ballot form in half along the
perforation
4) Scan the right-hand half
5) The barcode will be decrypted to reveal
the candidate list
6) Check the candidate list matches the
left-hand half of the ballot form
[voters can check that ballot form barcodes
are correct]
Checking your vote has been included in the
count in the Preˆt a` Voter voting system
1) Go to the election website
2) Enter the number of your receipt
3) Check that your receipt matches the vote
recorded on the website
